The gassing of mental patients on Soviet territory was a topic of discussion in the Wehrmacht during September 1941, as shown by Halder's diary entry of September 26, which stated "Mental institutions in sector of AGp. North. Russians regard the feeble-minded as holy. Killing nevertheless necessary" [source, p.124, also submitted with a slightly different translation at Nuremberg as cited here]. On October 1, Halder noted that Wagner had discussed "Novgorod mental institutions" [source, p.133].
A decision to kill Novgorod mental patients using Sonderkommando Lange is documented in these decodes numbered 22 and 23, which were first discussed by Richard Breitman in Official Secrets, p.99 [citing PRO HW 16/32, 3 Oct. 1941]. They show, as Breitman states, an "extraordinary" cooperation between the army and Himmler's Personal Staff (Persoenliche Stab RFSS). The text of the first decode also clearly proves the involvement of T4 (represented by "Ltnt. HEFELMANN Kanzlei des Führers") and the willingness of a "senior physician" within the Wehrmacht, namely "FREYBERG of the army high command", to initiate a request to kill mental patients. The German text and an English translation appear below:
German:
Himmler's involvement in gassing decisions concerning the USSR can be traced to his visit to Minsk in mid-August, which led to the decodes of 16 and 18 August 1941 showing how Bach-Zelewski had demanded Lange's utilization (summarised in Der Dienstkalender p.195 note 15, image here). Nebe sent a telegram via Enigma to his home office asking for a KTI technician in the same context. These two facts confirm Bach-Zelewski's postwar account, as printed in Aufbau on 23.8.1946; Mattogno is therefore wrong to claim that Bach-Zelewski's account is unsupported by documentation (Chelmno, p.12).
In conclusion, there can be no doubt that these messages were sent to gain authorization for a gas van action, which Himmler duly gave [PRO HW 16/32, 4 Oct. 1941, item 20]. Lange had gassed mental patients at Soldau [source] and would gas "about 100,000 Jews" in the Warthegau [source]. The significance of Novgorod is the proof of how well Lange's activities were known and valued by individuals in the army high command (including its senior physicians), Hitler chancellery and Himmler's Personal Staff.
A decision to kill Novgorod mental patients using Sonderkommando Lange is documented in these decodes numbered 22 and 23, which were first discussed by Richard Breitman in Official Secrets, p.99 [citing PRO HW 16/32, 3 Oct. 1941]. They show, as Breitman states, an "extraordinary" cooperation between the army and Himmler's Personal Staff (Persoenliche Stab RFSS). The text of the first decode also clearly proves the involvement of T4 (represented by "Ltnt. HEFELMANN Kanzlei des Führers") and the willingness of a "senior physician" within the Wehrmacht, namely "FREYBERG of the army high command", to initiate a request to kill mental patients. The German text and an English translation appear below:
German:
An Hauptsturmführer GROTHMANN.English:
Auf Befehl Sturmbannführer BRANDT gebe ich folgendes Fs. zur Entscheidung Rf SS durch KONRAD, Scharführer. "SSD Posen B d O Nr 36. Geheim. An Rf SS, Sonderzug Heinrich; soeben rief mit dem Oberarzt FREYBERG vom Oberkdo des Heeres auf Veranlassung von Ltnt. HEFELMANN Kanzlei des Führers an, und bat darum zur Ausräumung von 3 Ihren Anstalten bei NOWGOROD an Ilmen-See ein Sonderkdo LANGE mit entsprechender Reparatur nach dort zu entsenden. Oberarzt FREYBERG erklärte sich bereit am 5. Oktober vormittags ein JU 52 nach Posen zu schicken, damit Krim.kommissar Lange mit etwa 5 Mitarbeitern seine Tätigkeit umgehend aufnimmt. Oberarzt FREYBERG wies auf die dringende Notwendigkeit des sofortigen Eintreffens hin, da die Insassen schwer Ruhrkrank sind und die Truppe die Anstalten als Quartiere dringend benötigt. Ich bitte um Entscheidung des RF SS, ob nach Lage der Dinge eine Entsendung des Sonderkommandos Lange nach NOWGOROD in Frage kommt. Fuer umgehende Mitteilung wäre ich dankbar, da gegebenenfalls noch einige Vorbereitungen für diese Aktion erforderlich sind. Höherer SS und Pol.führer. gezeichnet KOPPE, SS Gruppenführer."
To Hauptsturmführer GROTHMANN.We can also note here that these signals are embedded in lengthy lists of intercepted messages for that day; their placement as messages 22 and 23, with no visible disruption to subsequent signals in the day's run, provides ample confirmation that the message was intercepted on that date.
At the order of Sturmbannführer BRANDT I provide you with the following telex regarding decision Reichsführer SS KONRAD, Scharführer.
"SSD Posen commander of the order police number 36. Secret. To the Reichsführer SS, special train Heinrich; just now, the senior physician FREYBERG of the army high command has called at the instigation of lieutenant HEFELMANN [of] the Führer's chancellery and requests to sent Sonderkommando Lange with suitable repair [prob. means: apparatus] for the clearing of three of their asylums near NOWGOROD at lake Ilmen. The senior physician FREYBERG agreed to sent a JU 52 to Posen on the morning of 5 October, so that the chief inspector LANGE can immediately start working with about 5 staff members. The senior physician FREYBERG emphasized the urgent need of their immediate arrival, because the inmates are suffering from dysentery and the asylums are urgently needed for troop quarters. I request a decision of the Reichsführer SS if the dispatch of Sonderkommando Lange can be considered under the circumstances. I would be grateful for a prompt notification, since some preparations for this action may be necessary. The higher SS and police leader, signed KOPPE, SS Gruppenführer."
Himmler's involvement in gassing decisions concerning the USSR can be traced to his visit to Minsk in mid-August, which led to the decodes of 16 and 18 August 1941 showing how Bach-Zelewski had demanded Lange's utilization (summarised in Der Dienstkalender p.195 note 15, image here). Nebe sent a telegram via Enigma to his home office asking for a KTI technician in the same context. These two facts confirm Bach-Zelewski's postwar account, as printed in Aufbau on 23.8.1946; Mattogno is therefore wrong to claim that Bach-Zelewski's account is unsupported by documentation (Chelmno, p.12).
In conclusion, there can be no doubt that these messages were sent to gain authorization for a gas van action, which Himmler duly gave [PRO HW 16/32, 4 Oct. 1941, item 20]. Lange had gassed mental patients at Soldau [source] and would gas "about 100,000 Jews" in the Warthegau [source]. The significance of Novgorod is the proof of how well Lange's activities were known and valued by individuals in the army high command (including its senior physicians), Hitler chancellery and Himmler's Personal Staff.